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so clearly at the end of the *Natural History of Religion* (1757) is unmistakably the outcome of the argument of the *Dialogues* :—"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject." One cannot but feel that Dr. M'Ewen's discovery of something more than agnosticism in Hume rests to some extent on his failure to keep clearly distinct Hume's supposed personal convictions and the doctrines for which he was able to discover rational grounds. Again, it should be recognized, I think, that many of the statements and admissions which Dr. M'Ewen quotes by no means follow from the argument of the *Dialogues*, but are evidently introduced only with some dramatic purpose. And it should be remembered that Philo's strictures on dogmatic atheism are also perfectly consistent with Hume's scepticism, whose final word is "doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment."

An interesting fact bearing on Hume's influence on Kant which has not, I think, been much discussed, is mentioned in the Introduction. According to Dr. M'Ewen, Kant had in his hands in 1780, before beginning to write the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a manuscript translation of the *Dialogues*, which was never published, by J. A. Hamann. That there is some historical connection between Hume's criticism of 'Natural Religion' and Kant's famous critique of 'Rational Theology' would seem to be well established.

J. E. C.

Spinoza and Religion. By ELMER ELLSWORTH POWELL. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company; London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Co., 1906. — pp. xiv, 344.

The aim of this book is to prove that Spinoza was irreligious and his philosophy anti-religious. It is unfortunate that, in maintaining this thesis, the author did not avoid such aspersion on Spinoza's character and such misrepresentations of the facts of his life as indicate a lack of that spirit of impartiality which is the prime requisite in all critical investigations. Nor does Dr. Powell appear to have studied the philosopher's writings with enough thoroughness to enable him to grasp the true significance of his teaching. It is, of course, most obviously true that the word 'God' did not for Spinoza possess the same content that it has for the average religious Christian, but it is equally certain that it embraced for him the highest conception that the mind of man can reach, the source of all activity, and the supreme object of human love. For Dr. Powell, however, there can be no religion which is not directed toward a 'personal' power who can give his worshippers something in return. "The truth is," we are told, that religion seeks primarily, not "reason and principle," "unity," "the universal," etc., as such, but "help, protection, security, peace, fellowship, and other practical goods." Again, he says that in order to show that Spinoza had any interest in religion, "it would be necessary to point out in the peculiarities of his thinking a subjective preference for a world controlled by a

personal power." It is certainly true that this was not one of the "peculiarities of his thinking," and perhaps it was hardly worth while to write a book to demonstrate that Spinoza's doctrine does not coincide with religion conceived in this way.

E. RITCHIE.

Outline of the Vedanta System of Philosophy according to Shankara. By PAUL DEUSSEN. Translated by J. H. WOODS and C. B. RUNKLE. New York, The Grafton Press, 1906. — pp. viii, 45.

Professor Deussen of Kiel is well known as a student and expounder of Indian philosophy. The present brief sketch of Shankara's doctrine was published in 1883 as a part of the author's *Das System des Vendanta*. He has, however, revised and made some additions to the outline as it is here presented in an English translation.

The work is arranged in forty-four numbered sections, each of which states briefly but clearly the doctrine with regard to some definite topic. The six chapters, each of which embraces from four to ten sections, have the following titles: I, Introduction; II, Theology; III, Cosmology; IV, Psychology; V, Migration of the Soul; VI, Emancipation.

J. E. C.

Le sens de l'art, sa nature, son rôle, sa valeur. By PAUL GAULTIER. Paris, Hachette & Co., 1907. — pp. xxxii, 269.

Because of the long continued ascendancy of France in the practice of the fine arts, one is accustomed to look instinctively to the French for expert criticism, if not for the profounder philosophy, of art. The writings of Frenchmen in this field, therefore, come to us with a certain bias in their favor, and in the present case the bias is justified. The volume of Gaultier undertakes within a small compass to analyze and define beauty and its relations to art, to describe the function of art in society, to determine the relation of art to morality, and to formulate the principles of art criticism. An introduction to the book is written by the well-known philosopher Boutroux, and sixteen plates furnish illustrations of the meaning of the text. The plates are half-tone reproductions, made in the main from photographs of notable examples of painting, sculpture, and architecture. They illustrate such ideas as the following: The beauty of art does not consist in the perfection of form (Canova's *Perseus* and Legros's *Æsop*); the beauty of art is independent of the beauty of subject (works of Goya, Ligier-Richier, and Bosch, which have the ugly or monstrous for subjects); the evolution of expression in the history of sculpture; the historical value of style is independent of the historical interest of the subject; style as the exponent of the personality of the artist; style as the revealer of environment, epoch, race, etc.

In the first division of the work, which is the only division that is primarily concerned with the psychology and philosophy of art, the main theses are that beauty is æsthetic emotion objectified, and that the form of its